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In Sweden there are no workplace-based arrangements for the representa-
tion of employees independent of trade unions. There is no second channel
providing voice for employees outside the traditional union-employer bipartite
system, as this would not be compatible with the "Swedish model" based on
collective bargaining. This model implies strong trade unions at both the local
and central levels. While the emphasis is on the latter, the model does not
preclude strong enterprise- and plant-level employee participation practices.
Local union bodies, white- and blue-collar, take part in extensive co-
determination procedures, in addition to wage bargaining. The Act on Co-
determination at Work provides a general instrument for these procedures, giv-
ing local union bodies a participative role somewhere between information
exchange and consultation on the one hand, and negotiations and collective
bargaining on the other (Iseskog 1990, 76). The absence so far of sanctions in
the event of conflict limits the significance of co-determination procedures.
Nevertheless, the impact of the act on cooperative practices at the plant level
should not be underestimated.
Swedish trade unions have always been skeptical of council arrangements,
regardless of their form. With very few exceptions, council-like institutions
have historically been rejected. Various arrangements similar to works councils
do exist but are not independent of the unions. The latter are strongly present
at the workplace, and both the white- and blue-collar unions have workplace
sections. Works council co-determination has been viewed as a threat to the
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legitimacy of the collective bargaining system, and as a potential source of
greater labor market inequality. The aim of the unions has therefore always
been to ensure that all council forms were safely founded in collective
agreements. It may, however, be questioned whether this policy can be main-
tained.
Although the Swedish model is characterized by regulation at the central
level, there is no absence of monitoring and enforcement arrangements at the
workplace. Co-determination councils, health and safety committees, and
board representatives ensure that rules are observed. However, these are all
part of the bipartite system. Some arrangements are also functionally linked to
corresponding public institutions. For example, the health and safety commit-
tees are supported by the National Board of Occupational Safety and Health,
and the development of co-determination is supported by the Swedish Work
Environment Fund.
Those workplace arrangements in Sweden that resemble works councils
should rather be labeled informal joint councils. Projects for industrial democ-
racy in Sweden were originally based on joint consultative bodies. Joint coun-
cils (driftsnamnder) were launched in the 1920s by the Industrial Democratiza-
tion Commission as the means to democratize Swedish industry. But the
proposals were never realized. After the Second World War joint councils were
introduced through collective agreement between the largest unions, the LO
and TCO, and the main employers' association, the SAF. In the mid-1970s they
were replaced by a co-determination system based on collective bargaining.
That system is now being transformed into a system of consultation and partic-
ipation arrangements.
Today, council-like arrangements emerge at an increasing rate in Sweden for
practical reasons. They are required or regulated by formal law; typically they
are joint employer-union creations that rest on industrial agreement and the
Co-determination Act. There is no legal basis for council-like arrangements in
Sweden, with the exception of the health and safety committees which are
mandatory joint councils.
7.2 Institutional Foundations of the Swedish Model
The Swedish model of industrial relations, characterized by a highly central-
ized bargaining system and strong social parties independent of the state, is
rapidly changing. This section gives an account of the institutional foundation
of the Swedish model, with special attention to works councils and co-
determination.
7.2.1 Structure of Swedish Labor Market Organizations
Collective bargaining has always been the core institution of the Swedish
model.
1 Pay bargaining is normally conducted at three levels. First, there are
1. For a comparison between the Swedish model and other industrial relations systems, see
Bratt (1990). For a thorough account of Swedish labor laws, see Edlund and Nystrom (1988).191 Sweden: Joint Councils under Strong Unionism
negotiations between the central organizations of business and labor, followed,
second, by negotiations and formal agreements between member unions
(sometimes cartels of unions) and employers' associations at the industry level,
and, third, by company and workplace-level negotiations between employers
and workplace union sections on the application of the agreement. The most
important functions of the collective agreements are to maintain industrial
peace and determine a floor for wages and working conditions, as employers
cannot offer their employees conditions inferior to those laid down in the col-
lective agreement.
This whole system is now under great pressure and may be abolished. A
rising number of strikes and lockouts, mainly among white-collar workers and
public employees, has brought the system into disrepute. Growing wage drift
during the 1980s also eroded the legitimacy of the system. New forms of work
organization, new methods of rationalizing production, and new payment sys-
tems put additional pressure on the model. On the other hand, the social part-
ners accepted a national income policy agreement for 1991 and 1992, thereby
preserving and temporarily increasing the centralism of the Swedish model.
Apart from collective agreements on wages and working conditions that are
concluded for a limited period, a number of permanent agreements have ex-
isted for many years. In 1938, the main employer and worker organizations,
the SAF and the LO, reached the so-called Saltsjobaden Agreement, which
codified negotiating procedures and the handling of disputes. There are also
several cooperation agreements, most of them concluded in the 1940s between
the SAF and the LO. Some of these were terminated in conjunction with the
passage of the Act on Co-determination at Work in 1976. The act was supposed
to be supplemented by a central agreement on co-determination; it was not
until 1982, however, that the Agreement on Efficiency and Participation was
actually signed.
The dominant central union organization is the Swedish Confederation of
Unions for blue-collar workers (LO). It was formed in 1898 and has 24 mem-
ber unions which together organize more than two million workers. (The popu-
lation of Sweden is 8.4 million.) The largest member unions are the Local
Government Workers Union, the Metalworkers Union, the Union of State
Workers, the Retail Workers Union, and the Building Workers Union. The LO
has urged several of its affiliated unions to amalgamate to make the negotiating
system work better. In the fall of 1991 a planned amalgamation of three indus-
trial unions failed.
The main organization for white-collar employees is the Swedish Confeder-
ation of Unions (TCO) with more than one million members. Organizational
density among salaried employees is almost as high as among blue-collar
workers. The largest of the TCO's 21 member unions is the Union of Salaried
Employees in Industry. Next are the Local Government Salaried Employees
Union and the Government Salaried Employees Union. The Swedish Union
of Foremen and Supervisors withdrew from the TCO in 1980 but returned
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There is a third central organization with 25 member unions, the Central
Confederation of Professional Unions (SACO). Its largest member unions are
the National Union of Teachers and the Union of Graduate Engineers. Other
strong SACO unions are the physicians' union and the union of lawyers. The
SACO is organized along professional lines. Historically, its member unions
were, with a few exceptions, divided by occupation rather than by industry
(Lundh 1991, 2). The LO was reorganized according to the industrial union
principle at the beginning of the twentieth century, whereas the TCO has both
professional and industrial unions.
To coordinate and centralize bargaining, unions form "negotiating cartels."
In the private sector a cartel may involve unions from different central organi-
zations, in particular the TCO and SACO. As the significance of the central
bargaining model is decreasing, so is that of the cartels.
The dominant private sector employers' association is the Swedish Employ-
ers' Confederation (SAF). It was formed in 1902 in reaction to the creation of
the LO. Its largest member associations are the Swedish Engineering Employ-
ers' Association, the Retail Employers' Association, the SAF General Group,
and the Building Employers' Association. There are plans for a radical reorga-
nization of the SAF, aimed at amalgamating its 36 member associations into
seven to nine negotiating groups to improve services to member companies
while at the same time enabling affiliation fees to be reduced.
2 The SAF
believes that the division between blue- and white-collar workers and the occ-
upationalism of the SACO are antiquated, arguing that a modern production
organization requires only one category of employees—referred to as "co-
workers"—and individualized employment relations. The breakdown of the
old Swedish model and the need for new structures are also illustrated by the
fact that the Metalworkers Union and its counterpart on the employer side have
in recent years preferred to conclude their agreements ahead of the LO and
SAF.
The Swedish public sector is large compared to most other OECD countries,
employing about one-third of the Swedish workforce. Public sector unions
won full rights to negotiate and strike in 1966. There are three employers'
organizations covering the public sector, the State Employers' Negotiating
Agency (SAV), the Swedish Association of Local Government Authorities, and
the Swedish County Councils Association.
7.2.2 Cooperation Agreements
The Saltsjobaden Agreement codified a structure that made possible increas-
ingly comprehensive collective regulation of working conditions. It was fol-
lowed by cooperation agreements on special subjects. One of these was joint
councils; others were vocational training and safety and health. In 1992, the
2. For further information, see European Industrial Relations Review, no. 217 (February 1992).193 Sweden: Joint Councils under Strong Unionism
last remnant of the Saltsjobaden spirit, the cooperation agreement on safety
and health, was renounced by the SAF.
The Joint Councils Agreement, concluded in 1946, was a compromise in the
ongoing debate on industrial democracy. The spirit of Saltsjobaden that had
ended the adversarial industrial relations of the 1920s made the unions accept
the idea of joint councils, in line with international efforts to establish works
council systems after the Second World War. While the LO had proposed joint
councils at all levels of the enterprise, which were to include white-collar
workers, the system that was finally accepted was almost identical with that
proposed by the SAF. Joint councils were formed only at the company or plant
level, and the TCO was excluded (Johansson 1989, 268).
While the mission of the joint councils had been to solve problems and en-
hance rationalization at the firm and plant level, they increasingly came to be
viewed by the unions as a potential threat to worker solidarity across enterprise
borders. There was also a fear that they might compete with the unions. In
negotiations with the SAF, the LO had argued that its representatives would
refuse to cooperate with nonunionized workers within a works council system
and that therefore the workforce representatives on the joint councils should
be elected exclusively by union members (Johansson 1989, 273). The result
was the formation of joint councils based on collective agreement between the
LO and SAF.
A short time later, the TCO and SAF concluded their own Joint Councils
Agreement. Unlike the LO, the white-collar unions accepted the absence of
formal connection between the union and the joint councils. Because the
white-collar unions were weak at the time, employers were able to insist that
all white-collar workers, not only union members, would have the right to vote
in the joint council elections and to serve as council members. When at the end
of the 1950s the white-collar unions had grown in power, this arrangement was
ended and a new agreement gave the white-collar unions the same rights as the
LO, excluding nonunionized workers from the joint councils (Nilsson 1985,
146).
The position of the joint councils was weak. The purpose of the agreement
was to provide employees with information about matters such as work organi-
zation and investment. The joint councils also had a consultative function, al-
though management retained the power to make all final decisions. The unions
felt they had no real power on the joint councils and wanted the councils to
have a stronger impact on management decision making. When the agreement
was revised in 1966, "a provision was added to the effect that an employer
wishing to do so could delegate his decision-making powers in certain limited
fields to the joint councils" (Edlund et al. 1989, 10).
Yet evaluations of the councils differed. Carlsson (1966, 98), then the
LO's education director, gives a positive picture of the system, although he
acknowledges that the activity and significance of the councils varied a great
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As they are consultative institutions the result depends, to a large degree, on
the parties' ability to co-operate; if one of the parties is unwilling, it is prob-
able that the activity will be only formal. And even when the parties are
aware of the importance of co-operation they must in addition have the abil-
ity to get satisfactory results. They must also learn to regard the enterprise
from the viewpoint of the council, instead of regarding it only onesidedly.
So far, there is a difference between the work done by the worker representa-
tives on the councils and the work on the board of the local union section.
The borderline is not always clear, and is defined by tradition and practical
adjustments. There is, of course, always close contact between the workers
representatives in the works council and the union section; as a rule the
chairman or another union leader is also a works council member.
One may add that as an LO representative, the author somewhat underesti-
mates the impact of the TCO representatives in the joint councils.
The revision of the agreement did not satisfy the unions. At the end of the
1960s, the LO complained that there was no co-determination machinery in
Sweden and, in particular, no bodies corresponding to German works councils
(Hauser 1971, 11). Swedish councils were said to exist only by virtue of collec-
tive agreement, and their chief function was no more than to "provide for an
exchange of views and consultation on matters of common interest." In the
absence of sanctions for noncompliance with the agreed procedure, Swedish
councils in practice often failed to allow for satisfactory co-determination. The
LO concluded that it was necessary to secure a better balance of power be-
tween the two sides by extending the right to negotiate to all matters at all
levels where decisions are taken and by creating a general obligation for the
employer to negotiate. "In other words, the employer should be compelled to
enter into negotiations at the time when he takes a decision, and not, as has
been the case up to now, only when implementing a decision already taken,
usually only at the direct request of the unions. In important decisions which
are likely to have adverse social repercussions which are difficult to correct at
a later stage, the unions should also have a right of veto" (Hauser 1971, 18).
In the beginning of the 1970s the LO still hoped to revitalize the joint coun-
cil system. Arne Geijer, the president of the LO, argued that the union move-
ment should stick to its role as an independent, external, and primarily claim-
making party, again expressing the LO's fear of collusive entanglement through
works councils. But Geijer continued that there was also room for much closer
management-union cooperation inside the firm: "Work councils must be given
a proper picture of their companies' true situation. The most logical develop-
ment would be for the councils gradually to take on responsibility for questions
of long-term planning" (1971, 5).
In subsequent years, however, joint councils gradually came to be regarded
as inadequate by the unions. Janerus (1989), a secretary in the LO industrial
democracy department, argued that the launching of joint councils in Sweden
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1950s had made the role of the joint councils unclear. The emerging Swedish
model driven by central bargaining, solidaristic wage policy, and structural ra-
tionalization measures above the plant level had, according to Janerus, made
the council system redundant. As unions perceived rationalization, in line with
the theories of LO economists like Meidner and Rehn, as an objective force
above the realm of the local plant, the joint councils lost their mission.
7.2.3 Works Councils and Labor Law Reforms of the 1970s
The official report of the commission that investigated the labor laws and
launched the Co-determination Act (Arbetsrattskommitten 1975, 16) states as
a general principle that all questions touching upon the employment relation-
ship should be open to co-determination proceedings based on negotiation.
Unions are given a right to be informed, and a primary obligation is created
for employers to negotiate on any matter before carrying out major changes.
The committee's original proposal (Arbetsrattskommitten 1975, 39) pro-
vides for possible co-determination procedures through a works council set up
by the local parties. Two different procedures were suggested to regulate the
formation of a works council. According to the first, councils were to be set up
on the initiative of either a union or the employer. According to the second,
a works council could be created only on union initiative. Neither of these
suggestions was finally accepted. The act that finally passed Parliament was
based on the view of the LO and TCO representatives of the commission.
The representatives of the unions rejected the creation of a legal right for
the employer to initiate works councils (Arbetsrattskommitten 1975, 945). In
a dissenting opinion, the union representatives agreed that unification of differ-
ent employee organizations at the plant level was desirable. This, however,
should not be imposed by works council legislation. Instead, it was to be left
to the parties themselves—that is, the different unions and the employer—to
organize co-determination on the basis of the negotiation principle. Co-
determination through legally based works councils was said to be suited only
for countries with comparatively weak unions; the strong Swedish unions
would not benefit from it, and the parties should be free to develop co-
determination procedures on their own without legal guidance.
3
7.3 Legislated Reform
In 1977 the Joint Councils Agreement was superseded by the Co-
determination Act. Unions in Sweden as well as in other countries had become
radicalized at the end of the 1960s. Union leaders came under increasing pres-
sure from the rank and file and began to demand reforms at the workplace.
Unrest in the labor market and more frequent unofficial strikes forced the
3. It is widely believed that at the time the Swedish unions were also motivated by a desire to
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unions to seek legislative solutions when negotiations with the SAF did not
yield substantive results. The Social Democratic government, closely allied
with the LO and eager to stay on good terms with the TCO, was prepared to
push union demands through Parliament. Legislation of this kind on industrial
relations matters represented a major deviation from the Saltsjobaden model.
Most of the existing labor legislation was introduced in the 1970s, including
legislation on co-determination, workforce representation on boards of direc-
tors, and health and safety. These laws, as well as subsequent agreements be-
tween the social partners, have shaped the procedures for cooperation and co-
determination in Sweden. There are no alternative bodies to the unions for the
exercise of co-determination. It is only the unions at the local and central levels
that are the legal representatives of the organized employees, collectively and
sometimes individually. Nonunionized employees are only indirectly repre-
sented.
7.3.1 Health and Safety Committees
There is, however, one exception to the normal negotiation and bargaining
procedures. On health and safety matters, employees in workplaces with more
than 50 workers are represented by safety representatives on joint health and
safety committees. The Work Environment Act obliges safety representatives
to act for all employees, unionized and nonunionized. Representatives are,
however, appointed by the union, in line with the basic premise of Swedish
industrial relations that workers are represented by unions.
Health and safety protection is regulated by law and, in addition, by special
agreements between the unions and employers' associations. The law deter-
mines both substantive measures of health and safety protection and the rights
and obligations of safety representatives. Responsibility for the working envi-
ronment, including measures of a preventive nature, rests primarily with the
employer. The Work Environment Act has recently been sharpened, forcing
the employer to take a comprehensive view of health and safety matters and
work organization.
Compliance with work environment legislation is supervised by a central
authority, the National Board of Occupational Safety and Health, on which the
social partners are represented.
4 The board maintains regional bodies, the labor
inspectorates, which also include representatives of the social partners. It is
empowered to elaborate the rules of the Work Environment Act by issuing
general implementation orders of a binding nature, some of which carry penal
sanctions. In special cases, the labor inspectorate can issue an injunction to
secure compliance with work environment regulations.
The fact that there are special health and safety committees causes certain
problems. The co-determination system greatly overlaps the health and safety
4. Representation of the social partners may be canceled by the present, nonsocialist govern-
ment. In February 1991, the SAF decided to withdraw from all government boards.197 Sweden: Joint Councils under Strong Unionism
system, as matters involving work safety issues are also covered by co-
determination (Brulin and Victorin 1992, 157). For example, the work environ-
ment agreement between the SAF and the LO-PTK
5 gives employees in the
covered sector a majority on health and safety committees, with employee rep-
resentatives recruited proportionally from the different unions according to
their strength at the workplace. Decisions are made by majority, but commit-
tees should seek consensus first. Decisions with financial implications for the
company require unanimity (Edlund and Nystrom 1988, 72). The special rules
for the SAF and LO-PTK sector are based on the Co-determination Act.
7.3.2 Act on Board Representation
In 1972 the Act on Board Representation for Employees in Joint Stock Com-
panies and Cooperatives was passed after long and divisive discussion. The act
was revised in 1976 and 1988. According to the new Worker Directors Act,
employees of companies with more than 25 workers are entitled to appoint two
members to the board of directors, and three members in companies where
more than one occupational group is present. Worker directors have the same
rights as other board members (Edlund and Nystrom 1988, 46). At non-
unionized companies, of which there are very few, the law prescribes elections.
Normally, worker directors are appointed by the unions.
The purpose of the act was to give employees both information and influence
on the company. Workforce representatives are always in the minority and may
not take part in discussions relating to negotiations with the unions. There had
been concerns in the 1960s that worker representatives would be torn between
loyalty to the enterprise and loyalty to their fellow employees. "These misgiv-
ings, however, were dispelled once an extensive program began to unfold for
the development of employee participation, board representation being just one
of several instruments, which meant that it could be used and controlled more
adequately" (Edlund et al. 1989,16). Generally, board representation has come
to be regarded as a means of keeping the union informed, rather than of di-
rectly influencing corporate decision making.
In 1990 the subject of divided loyalties returned when many of the work-
force representatives had become "owners." Rapid development of equity op-
tions systems and employee share ownership had begun to blur the distinction
between workforce and shareholder representatives on boards of directors. The
broad recruitment of union members added to this, in that many of the manag-
ers of personnel departments have a union background (Gehlin and Nilsson
1985) and quite a few supervisors have been active members of an LO union
section before advancing in their careers (Larsson 1984, 117). The scope and
implication of this "mix" of roles are unknown.
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7.3.3 Shop Stewards Act
Another arrangement that has supported decentralization of industrial rela-
tions and closer contacts between unions and employers at the workplace is the
Shop Stewards Act of 1974. The act entitles elected workplace union officials
to a "reasonable" amount of paid leave from work to discharge their union
duties and keep in touch with the members. Paid leave also gives workplace
union officials an opportunity to get involved in informal joint committee ac-
tivities.
Full-time shop stewards are, however, becoming a problem for the legiti-
macy of the unions, the fear being that they might lose contact with other work-
ers. The choice of a shop steward at the Kiruna/LKAB local of the Minework-
ers' Union not to take full-time leave for union duties, challenging an
established behavior among union officials that has recently been much de-
bated in the union journals, was given great public attention in the fall of 1989.
7.3.4 Co-determination System
As stated before, one purpose of the co-determination legislation was to
avoid forms of co-determination similar to works councils. Democratization of
working life was supposed to take place inside the bipartite system, strengthen-
ing the role of formal negotiations and producing collective agreements.
Nearly all aspects of the employment relationship are therefore in principle
open to co-determination proceedings. Yet, the right to negotiate has to some
extent been limited, in that negotiations are supposed to be cooperative. Also,
while the unions are given an opportunity to influence decision making in the
hope that the two sides will arrive at consensus, the employer still has the
final decision.
The Co-determination Act of 1977 was strongly opposed by employers, and
it took a long time before supplementary collective agreements specifying the
intentions of the act were signed. Many observers believe, however, that the
employers have benefited from the co-determination system and from the obli-
gation it imposes on them to negotiate. Negotiations often influence the unions
as much as they influence the employer, if not more (Blomquist 1982). Smart
employers turn the negotiations into a continuous seminar on the economic
situation in general, and that of the firm in particular. Union representatives
sometimes feel that they are being held hostage by the co-determination proce-
dures. Also, legal provisions for sanctions in the event of employer noncompli-
ance are weak and diffuse. Disputes are supposed to be settled by the parties
at the industry level, and some procedural matters may be brought to the Labor
Court or, in the private sector, to an arbitration board. An employer who has
failed to inform the unions in time may be fined by the Labor Court. If he has
informed them, however, it is very hard for the unions to change his decision.
In general, the act is seen as providing for information and consultation
rather than co-determination in a strict sense. A comparison of the Swedish co-199 Sweden: Joint Councils under Strong Unionism
determination system with the German works council system concludes that
"the local union's right to be consulted on various issues does not include an
obligation that management also reach agreement with the union. And in this
respect the rights of German works councils—on a narrow range of questions
that are subject to full co-determination and conciliation—are perhaps
stronger" (Thelen 1991b, 212). This crucial point was not changed by the col-
lective agreements concluded on the basis of the Co-determination Act.
Yet, the act should not be evaluated only on its formal merits. It has changed
the climate for co-determination, and there are reasons to believe that the coop-
erative culture at many Swedish workplaces is related to it. James Fulcher goes
as far as to argue that the act "comprehensively changed the legal framework
of plant-level industrial relations by abolishing the employer's rights, institu-
tionalizing worker influence, and ending the superior legal position of the em-
ployers. It would be no exaggeration to say that it challenged the capitalist
relations of production" (1991, 267).
The intention of the legislators was that the Co-determination Act should be
supplemented by central agreements and, subsequently, by agreements at the
local level, in line with the traditional Swedish model. In 1978 a central co-
determination agreement was concluded for the national government, followed
by one in 1980 for local government. It is symptomatic that agreements were
concluded first in the public sector, and that these agreements were quite de-
tailed and oriented toward bipartite negotiations. Negotiations in the private
sector were more difficult. Private employers did not want an agreement that
emphasized negotiations because they regarded direct participation by individ-
ual employees as equally important. The private sector co-determination
agreement was more in line with management preferences. Its emphasis on
efficiency and the parties' respective responsibility for productivity constitute
in many respects a break with the 1970s.
7.3.5 Agreement on Efficiency and Participation
The 1982 Agreement on Efficiency and Participation between the SAF and
the LO-PTK states that "the forms of participation and co-determination shall
be adapted to local circumstances at the workplace. The local parties have a
joint responsibility for developing suitable participation and co-determination
practices." On request by one of the local parties, the employer and the local
union organization are to negotiate an agreement on the way in which co-
determination shall be exercised. According to the central agreement, there are
three possible forms of co-determination: (1) negotiations between the com-
pany and its local unions in accordance with the Act on Co-determination, (2)
"line negotiations," under which union representatives participate at the vari-
ous levels of the company's line organization, and (3) creation of "bipartite
participation and information bodies." According to the central agreement, lo-
cal agreements must clearly indicate which form of co-determination is cho-
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cised in accordance with locally agreed practice, the primary obligation to
negotiate and the responsibility to provide information in accordance with the
Act on Co-determination must be observed. In reality, very few local
agreements were concluded, although the local parties often act as if they have
a local agreement. Joint consultative bodies are created for dealing with a par-
ticular problem or union representatives are inserted in the ordinary line of
management, for example, in semiautonomous work groups, without this hav-
ing been regulated by local agreement. Arrangements of this kind are viewed
by both parties as "bipartite participation and information bodies" or "line ne-
gotiations," although they have no formal legitimation. The juridical status of
these arrangements is therefore unclear.
In the early 1980s co-determination procedures were much more formalized
and conducted through negotiations, especially in the public sector. Increas-
ingly, however, practices in national and local government seem to be ap-
proaching those in the private sector (Edlund et al. 1989, 28). Practices that
have developed from the Agreement on Efficiency and Participation between
the SAF and the LO-PTK have in this way gradually become norms.
Since the passing of the act and the signing of the central agreements, infor-
mal participation has become more frequent, partly as a consequence of the
agreements and partly in response to new requirements in production. Bipartite
negotiations and co-determination bodies are increasingly being bypassed (Ed-
lund et al. 1989, 67). Assured of influence at the general, joint-consultation
level, unions have for the most part sanctioned these developments. The new
ways of rationalizing production favor informal participation, for example,
project group organization or semiautonomous work groups. In some work-
places, the emerging informal structures have been formalized.
Paradoxically, the Co-determination Act that superseded the Joint Councils
Agreement now supports arrangements similar to joint councils. Co-
determination oriented toward negotiation and collective agreement is replaced
with information and consultation arrangements in joint bodies along the line
of management. The new forms of co-determination are not entirely indepen-
dent of the Co-determination Act since local unions have recourse to the act as
a legal support in discussions with management. If cooperation in the new
informal bodies is not satisfactory, unions may demand negotiations based on
the procedures of the act. But this is becoming increasingly unusual.
6 A recent
study on the implementation of the Co-determination Act concludes that man-
agement opposition to the act has mellowed considerably, and that the unions
consider the act as having been effective in its attempt to provide co-
determination: "In fact, management has joined hands with the union in ad-
6. After the Co-determination Act had been passed, the LO and the TCO/SACO negotiation
cartel, PTK, concluded an agreement on Union Coordination on Co-determination. Similar
agreements have been concluded between unions in other sectors. Interunion cooperation made it
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justing to the changes brought about by the Act, and has not considered this
change detrimental" (Dokras 1990, 214). In recent years, Dokras notes, the act
has been criticized for not providing the unions with what it had promised.
Dokras's study, conducted mainly through expert interviews, claims to dis-
prove this:
If rapid technological change alters the way in which work will be conducted
in future, the Act provides the proper avenue to structure the consequent
change in industrial relations. By stressing the negotiation element in co-
determination, the Act has paved the way for better industrial relations by
avoiding the path of conflict and by giving the unions a say in almost all
matters concerning the workplace, and also other changes the next decade
will bring for Swedish industry.
7.4 Recent Trends in Swedish Industrial Relations
Swedish industrial relations are changing. The center of gravity has moved
to the local level. Flexible joint council forms of employee representation, ad
hoc or permanent, have gained significance. An important factor in this are
new methods of rationalizing production (Brulin and Nilsson 1991a, 328). The
globalization of the Swedish economy, the ongoing internationalization of
Swedish enterprises, and a divided front among employers are also changing
the traditional Swedish model (Lundberg 1985), and the change of government
and the very deep recession have played a part as well. Unemployment is now
rising, although from a very low level. The crucial test for the Swedish model
is whether unemployment can be kept down. Even the nonsocialist government
that came to power in September 1991 has promised to do everything possible
to avoid an unemployment crisis similar to that affecting the rest of Europe.
But it has also pledged to abolish the employee investment funds and change
the labor laws to promote a more individualized employer-employee rela-
tionship.
7.4.1 New Forms of Work Organization and Participatory Structures
Sweden is still one of the most affluent countries in the world. Swedish firms
have become world leaders, building competitive advantage through continu-
ous upgrading. In this, the Swedish industrial relations environment served as
a source of challenges and pressures, fostering high-quality management and
productive employer-employee relations. The competitiveness debate in Swe-
den has for the last few years been preoccupied with taxes, wage levels, ex-
change rates, interest rates, and inflation. Recently, however, more dynamic
factors have been considered. Solvell, Zander, and Porter (1991, 215) argue
that "in the long run, high productivity and high wages require .. . upgraded
factors of production, increasingly sophisticated customers, strong clusters of
supporting and related industries, and tough rivalry. With these pressures and
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technologies and better products, and to move into less price-sensitive market
segments, thereby upgrading competitive advantage and gaining the ability to
pay higher wages." As an additional factor one may add new forms of work
organization and corresponding arrangements for employee and employer co-
operation, as the new methods to rationalize production require the involve-
ment of employees at various levels in the reorganization of the labor process
(Produktivitetsdelegationens betankande 1991, 82).
The Co-determination Act gives unions the right to be informed and obliges
the employer to negotiate any changes that are of importance for union mem-
bers. In practice, this is often conducted in bipartite participation and informa-
tion bodies called "co-determination councils." The unions are informed about
planned changes in the organization of production. In case of a major change,
a joint council is set up to make the change process smoother. For minor
changes, a project group is created. Joint councils and project groups are often
formed on an ad hoc basis, and their members represent a broad range of func-
tions and roles. Very often the employer himself wants some sort of union
representation. But he also often requests that the individual not just represent
the union but also have a professional view.
Co-determination councils and the various bodies set up by them function
as integrated representation and consultation councils. Almost all employees
are given representation through their union; the density of union organization
is very high, about 80 percent. Still, these are not primarily negotiating bodies.
Sometimes disputes within co-determination bodies may be channeled into the
negotiation system. But often the unions, having been consulted or informed
in a proper way, in the end must accept a employer's decision. There are also
workplaces where employee representation is weak. Here the unions get only
a minimum of information, in line with the act and the central agreements, and
the employer does not let them take part in the planning and monitoring of
change processes. At the same time, some employers that used to oppose the
co-determination procedures increasingly use them to set up consultative coun-
cils to improve communication between management and employees on pro-
duction issues.
7.4.2 Capital Rationalization and Service Management
A new management strategy is replacing Taylorism in the most progressive
Swedish enterprises, aimed at "modernizing" the organization of industrial
production. Taylorism is succeeded by more market-oriented, flexible, decen-
tralized, and integrated forms of organization, including arrangements for
communication, participation, and co-determination. The core message of the
new management strategy is that to be successful, an enterprise must develop
strong motivation among its employees. For this, employees must have a part in
the organization of their work. Flexibility is the catchword of the new strategy.
"Hard" control systems are supplemented with "softer" methods, such as qual-
ity circles, deliberately developed corporate cultures, and charismatic leader-203 Sweden: Joint Councils under Strong Unionism
ship. Through computerized information systems, top management is able to
control more independent subunits, which often operate as profit centers at
different levels of a "flattened" corporate hierarchy (Sandberg et al. 1992,
271).
The new forms of work organization are not developed in a vacuum. The
Swedish manufacturing industry is undergoing a paradigmatic change toward
"capital rationalization," pioneered by firms like Asea (ABB) (Bjbrkman and
Lundquist 1987, 61). To speed up the throughput of products, one of the main
goals of capital rationalization, the organizational design is changed. Since
complex hierarchies inhibit a smooth flow of production, capital rationaliza-
tion encourages decentralization of responsibility and authority. In particular,
group work and job rotation are used to speed up the flow of products through
the organization.
If capital rationalization constitutes the core of the new management strat-
egy in manufacturing, "service management" (Normann 1984) is its equivalent
in the service sector. In service management, image and culture are deployed
as management tools. Client-oriented work organization and effective commu-
nication with and between employees are used to help achieve consistent qual-
ity of service. "Internal marketing" is viewed as equal in importance to exter-
nal marketing. The leaders of a service organization are to "market" the
organization not only to its customers but also to its personnel. According to
the service management concept, the most important component of the service
system is the staff at the front-line who meet the customer at the "moment
of truth."
Do the new methods of rationalizing production favor works council—like
structures of participation? It is too early to make a final evaluation of the
impact of the new management concepts on communication, participation, and
co-determination. The tendencies and reports are contradictory. The Swedish
debate on productivity, work organization, and workplace democracy is much
affected by the international debate, and especially by the Japanese example.
Skeptics expect that the new rationalization methods will turn into a "super-
Taylorism" actually inhibiting dialogue and participation. The Swedish discus-
sion now highlights the negative aspects of Japanese "lean production," espe-
cially that it makes workers work not only smarter but also much harder and
that workers are encouraged to discuss limited productivity-related problems
while otherwise performing very standardized and monotonous work tasks.
Three Swedish researchers, after a visit to nine Japanese transplants in the
U.S. automobile industry, report a "quasi-military factory regime" (Berggren,
Bjorkman, and Hollander 1991,4). Although Japanese management talk about
small-group activities, job rotation, quality circles, a high level of communica-
tion, and so forth, the factories were found to be characterized by discipline
and punishment, not at all illustrating a break with the Taylorist paradigm of
work organization. Workers are tightly controlled, and operators are trained
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Suggestions for improving the production process are encouraged. But any
deviation from standardized procedures is forbidden.
Other researchers and management consultants argue to the contrary that
workers in Japan, although there is no legal framework for worker participation
in management, are "vocal about management, and joint consultation between
labor unions and the company at the enterprise and plant level is remarkably
widespread" (Koike 1987, 319). According to the kaizen method (Imai 1986)
of improving production, now becoming very popular among Swedish manag-
ers, communication-oriented and cooperative labor-management relations are
decisive in improving productivity. Two main features of the new production
model—the "pull system" and employee involvement—might well be labeled
post-Taylorist in certain ways. Also, the new emphasis on task uncertainty and
worker responsibility does constitute a break with Taylorist rationalization
methods (Brulin 1993, 5).
7.5 The Swedish Experience: A Scattered Picture
Many Swedish firms, convinced of the importance of improving communi-
cation between management and unions, are today setting up joint council ar-
rangements. An extreme case is the management-union advisory board of the
president of Volvo. Another arrangement that is becoming increasingly com-
mon are management-appointed joint project groups, like those at Alfa Laval,
that work on rationalization and work reorganization. Such groups are primar-
ily supposed to take a professional view, but they are also acting as union repre-
sentatives.
7 New rationalization concepts, especially capital rationalization and
service management, are behind the creation of participatory arrangements
that, in some respects at least, are in opposition to the Swedish model. Co-
determination, based on collective bargaining, is now being transformed into
joint consultation and participation, reducing the importance of negotiations
and in the long run perhaps weakening the bipartite system.
7.5.1 Informal Participation
At Ericsson in Soderhamn, a leftover from the postwar joint council system
was transformed into a "plant council," corresponding to the Co-determination
Act, which replaced the old central agreement on joint councils. There are two
main differences between the old joint council and the new plant council. To-
day, the council's agenda is set jointly by management and union representa-
tives, while in the past, it was determined solely by the employer. Also, the
working committees are jointly appointed. The main purpose of the plant coun-
7. According to the final report, "PRO-VISION," from Alfa Laval in Lund, and interviews in
1990 with the members of the companies' research group (Mariette Lagerberg, Lars-Erik Nilsson
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cil meetings, however, is still to inform the unions, primarily on economic
issues.
At the same time, a new cooperative culture developed at the plant, either
because of the Co-determination Act or as the result of pressing needs for cor-
porate renewal. In the mid-1980s, parts of the production process were reorga-
nized through joint management and union efforts (Brulin 1989, 85-98). Plant
management conceded the local union a role in this process, although only
unwillingly: the experts on computerized manufacturing did not want organi-
zational solutions from below, supervisors resisted change in their traditional
role, and management at different levels did not want to make additional effort.
In the early 1990s management began to perceive the traditional supervisors
as part of the problem. Computerized manufacturing had not solved as many
problems as it had promised, and the plant still had to improve flexibility, cut
lead times, and speed up the throughput of products. In addition, something
had to be done about bad working conditions, especially repetitive and monot-
onous jobs.
8 Today, management accepts employee and union representation in
the change process. For example, an initiative from a local representative of
the metalworkers' union who works in final product testing, to integrate testing
and assembly work, was strongly supported by management (Interview, Febru-
ary 1992). Working hours have been set aside and groups set up to carry out
the initiative. Despite criticism from supervisors, the union representative be-
came the informal project leader since he had the professional competence and
knew how to reorganize production in line with both rationalization and work
development requirements.
The workplace section of the metalworkers' union has one representative
for each of the plant's 40 departments, keeping an eye on the numerous local
wage schemes. There are also representatives of the white-collar unions, as
well as a special body for health and safety matters that has union and em-
ployer representation. Under the plant's participation regime, all of these might
play an active role in managing change to the extent that they have competence
and are motivated. The employer needs facilitators in the change process and
is apparently prepared to accept union influence in the reorganization. How-
ever, he does not want to have such influence regulated in formal agreements.
Although the central co-determination agreement among the labor market par-
ties recommends that the local parties conclude local co-determination
agreements, none has been concluded in Soderhamn.
7.5.2 Formal Agreements
Co-determination practices may differ even within the same enterprise. This
applies, for example, to Saab Automobiles AB (Brulin and Nilsson 1992b). At
8. Workplace program for Ericsson Telecom AB, Soderhamnsfabriken, Soderhamn, written by
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Saab, representatives from the unions representing the firm's numerous work-
places and plants have formed a "contact group," which handles co-
determination issues common to Saab as a whole. The group has 15 members,
8 from the metalworkers' union and 7 from the three white-collar unions. One
of its objectives is information exchange, another the formation of a unified
union voice. The group appoints three employee representatives to the com-
pany's board of directors. It also appoints a five-person group for negotiations
with the employer on common co-determination issues. Wages and working
conditions are excluded from its agenda. Still, according to one of its members,
it is a weakness of this group that, when the chips are down, the unions do not
speak with one voice on co-determination matters and are not able to settle
their own conflicts before negotiating with the employer (Interview, October
1991).
Below the central Saab level the unions conduct co-determination proce-
dures at each plant, sometimes jointly and sometimes individually. At the com-
pany's worldwide distribution center in Nykoping, the metalworkers' local
union section has been very active, and local management has been imagina-
tive. Jointly, they have moved away from hierarchical and Taylorist forms of
organization, and an encompassing change program is currently being carried
out that will create a work organization based on continuous learning in semi-
autonomous work groups, supported by a new pay system. Union involvement
in the process is highly informal. A project group was formed in the fall of
1989 with representatives from management and the blue-collar union. The
formal status of this group is hard to define. Co-determination, if conducted in
a way different from the negotiation procedure envisaged by the act, must be
regulated by agreement. Neither at the retail center nor at Saab centrally has
such an agreement been concluded, with the result that the project group has
no formal status. Nevertheless, the group has negotiated three agreements that
together constitute the local action program for rationalization and work devel-
opment. Formally, two of these agreements, on work organization and on train-
ing, were reached through co-determination negotiations; the third agreement,
on the new pay system, was negotiated through normal collective bargaining
on wages and working conditions.
Before and after concluding the agreements, many questions were handled
informally through other channels, in an interplay between formal negotiations
and informal communication. Informal procedures have, however, been facili-
tated by the Co-determination Act and by the industrial agreement on wages
and working conditions. The latter recommends that local parties create pay
systems that encourage job satisfaction and productivity and ensure high wages
over a long period. If no agreement can be reached, pure piece-rate or time-
based pay systems are to be used. This section replaces a previous one recom-
mending that local parties install piece-rate pay systems whenever possible, to
support a Taylorist organization of work.
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harmony. What is important is that the parties depend on each other. So far,
blue-collar workers appear to have been the winners. The supervisors have
been unenthusiastic, although they admit that changes are needed. White-
collar workers are losing jobs due to new technology and therefore have not
been deeply involved in the change program. The interesting question is
whether the cooperative culture will survive a more aggressive management.
Remarkably, the former president of Saab Automobiles, the General Motors
director David Herman, seems to have easily adjusted to participatory Swedish
practices. When he arrived in Sweden in early 1990, his first question was
reported to have been "Co-determination, what the hell is that?" Later he noted
several times in public that the unions had been constructive partners in reor-
ganizing the production process at Saab and in reshaping the firm: "Saab has
succeeded in reconstructing the enterprise on its own. We have reduced the
workforce by a third. At the same time productivity has risen dramatically, and
turnover and absenteeism due to short-time illness have begun to decline fast.
We could never have done this in such a short time without the partnership of
the strong Swedish unions. Naturally there have been conflicts but weaker
unions would not have helped, on the contrary."
9 Herman's opinion concerns
only the local level and co-determination at the firm level. He has been more
doubtful about the central bargaining system.
7.5.3 Public Sector
The public sector is also rapidly changing its work organization and co-
determination procedures. Local agreements in each county or at the work-
place replace central co-determination agreements, which until 1992 had cov-
ered all local government authorities and all county councils. This is just one
step in a general decentralization process.
Tengblad, Joelsson, and Wilhelmsson (1991, 120) have studied joint devel-
opment projects within the government sector. Their conclusion is that the par-
ties at the national level must decentralize co-determination procedures and
act as facilitators of direct co-determination and participation at the workplace
rather than as negotiating parties. The study argues that instead of conducting
co-determination negotiations over the heads of the staff concerned, it is their
responsibility to create a culture of cooperation at the workplace. Where the
parties have succeeded in creating a local cooperative culture, the bipartite
system functions as a development force in organizational change, creating
better jobs and more efficient organizations.
The Swedish co-determination system seems to be quite dynamic. As new
methods to rationalize production and organize work are practiced, co-
determination seems to adjust easily. More fundamental institutional change,
such as privatization or total reorganization, may still create considerable ten-
9. "Facket en partner, inte en motstandare: Saab-chefen vill avliva myten om fordelen med ett
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sion. The reorganization of the National Employment Training Board with
5,000 employees has been accompanied by heavy conflict, and at various times
the co-determination system more or less ceased to function (Brulin and Nils-
son 1992b). It seems that the change of the Training Board AMU from a gov-
ernment authority to a profit-oriented company and, among other things, the
abolition of seniority-based wages and salaries caused tensions that were too
strong for the co-determination system to contain. There were even unofficial
strikes among the teachers at some regional centers. Co-determination in the
new organization is more decentralized and has regained legitimacy. At some
centers co-determination procedures have evolved into council forms, whereas
the significance of co-determination has diminished at others.
7.6 Future of the Swedish Model
The SAF concludes from recent trends to decentralize enterprise organiza-
tion and restructure work organization that the Swedish model must be abol-
ished. Employer representatives have resigned from all corporatist bodies at
the national and sectoral levels. The chairman of the SAF, Ulf Laurin, argues in
a book entitled Farewell to Corporatism that it is time for individual employers
themselves, in each firm, to set wages and conclude local agreements on work-
ing conditions suited to their special needs and circumstances (1991, 9-18).
The SAF program "Free Markets and Free Choice" is based on the assumption
that the trend will be toward a free market economy, with individualization,
decentralization, and internationalization as its main characteristics.
Today, the SAF's member associations, instead of the SAF itself, are in
charge of collective bargaining on wages and other conditions of employment.
The intention is to hold all negotiations at the company level, individualize
the employment relationship, and limit the impact of the bipartite negotiation
system. According to the SAF, it is the companies themselves that are best
able to set wages that reward good performance and greater competence that
increases productivity and stimulates economic growth. The SAF is celebrat-
ing its first 10 decades with a book entitled The Rise and the Fall of the Swed-
ish Model: The Employers and Industrial Relations during Ten Decades (De
Geer 1992).
According to the SAF, the significance of institutionalized systems for co-
determination and participation is diminishing, in Sweden and elsewhere. The
SAF recognizes that single-status collective agreements ("coworker
agreements," or medarbetar avtal; see below) and the new work organization
may create pressures for works councils, from both employers and employees.
But such pressures should be dealt with locally firm by firm. Production prob-
lems can be handled in the line of management or in semiautonomous work
groups, and if the problem at hand demands it, a project group may be set
up. But the SAF sees no need for a formalized or institutionalized co-
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The nonsocialist government is trying to change the structure of unionism,
for example, by rescinding the tax exemption for union dues, raising the penal-
ties for unofficial strikes, and taking unemployment insurance under state con-
trol, making it obligatory, and increasing worker copayments from 5 to 30 per-
cent. A committee was appointed to review all labor laws (Kommittedirektiv
1991, 118), with special attention paid to the effect of the Swedish application
for membership in the European Community. Overlaps between co-
determination bodies and the health and safety committees will also be re-
viewed. The main issue, however, is who should be the legal subjects of labor
law, the employer and the individual employee or the employer and the union.
The Swedish industrial relations system is built on collective agreements and
labor laws that give unions, as representatives of the employees, legal rights to
be informed and to act. Individualization of these rights would fundamentally
change the Swedish model.
The majority of LO and TCO member unions recognize the pressures ex-
erted by the new work organization and rationalization methods for more de-
centralized participation systems. They have concluded that it will no longer
be possible to implement a solidaristic wage policy, the very core of the Swed-
ish model, through central bargaining—although some unions have gone so
far as to ask for state income policies or to demand a general strike as means
of preserving the centralism of the Swedish model. As a result of the decentral-
ization process, the centralist negotiating cartels of the TCO and SACO have
been or are about to be disbanded. Individual unions have strengthened their
positions and are trying to individualize their services to their members. Both
the LO and TCO argue that, while issues will increasingly be handled in semi-
autonomous work groups and in the line of management, collective bargaining
should remain the basis of employment relations, hoping to channel the pres-
sures towards decentralization into the traditional collective bargaining system.
To modernize the Swedish model and at the same time protect the strong
position of Swedish unions, top union officials must improve their knowledge
of work organization, so as to be able to support their local bodies in their
activities for further work development. To be able to prevent rapid increases
in wage differentials as a result of firm-specific wage systems, unions must
also develop national job classification systems compatible with new enterprise
job evaluation schemes. Refined wage statistics are also needed. These are
essential instruments for preventing the "Japanization" of Swedish industrial
relations (Brulin and Nilsson 1991b, 75-76).
Swedish unions are changing strategy toward a solidaristic work policy car-
ried out at the workplace. Their aim is to participate in the reorganization of
the labor process and turn it to the advantage of wage earners while also con-
tributing to productivity growth (Mahon 1991, 311). The concept of work de-
velopment catches the change from a solidaristic wage policy to a solidaristic
work policy. Work development is a way for local union bodies to create a work
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more productive work tasks. Work development is to be supported by new pay
systems that reward high and broad skills within a team organization.
In parts of Swedish industry, progressive management and workplace unions
seem to cooperate quite well in accordance with these ideas, simultaneously
rationalizing production and creating better jobs. At such workplaces, an infra-
structure of co-determination is created in support of joint work development.
The program of the metalworkers' union to modernize the Swedish model and
make it compatible with the demands of competitive and flexible production
has served as a guide for the union movement. According to the program, a
new compromise at the firm level may revolve around a constantly learning
work organization built on semiautonomous groups with the authority to re-
quest better tools, machines, and organizational design. Such groups must be
supported by a participatory infrastructure that is flexible and less oriented
toward bargaining (Swedish Metalworkers' Union 1989).
7.6.1 Coworker Agreements
The aim of Swedish employers today is to have one consolidated collective
agreement regulating co-determination, wages, and working conditions for all
employees of a given plant, with "single-status" workplaces representing a first
step toward single unionism. ABB Service in Sweden has been a pioneer of
"coworker agreements" applying to both blue- and white-collar workers. Pres-
sures to move toward consolidation of collective bargaining have been created,
not so much by the transaction costs of divided bargaining procedures or by
increasing interunion competition and demarcation disputes, but by changing
production requirements—the fact that a vertical division of labor between
different categories of workers, with its correspondingly divided union organi-
zations, no longer fits modern production methods.
Unlike Britain where single unionism has been put on the agenda by the
politicians (Bratt 1988, 166), in Sweden it is the employers that have been
very active on this issue. In fact, the needs that result from changing work
organization are recognized by worker representatives as well as by employers.
The latter are primarily interested, not in single unionism, but in single-status
or one-category employees—although in the long run the two are hard to sepa-
rate. In principle, the unions have been positive toward the idea since it is in
line with their productivity-oriented policies. In practice, however, it has been
hard for employers to obtain single-status agreements. In the mid-1980s an
effort was made at the Volvo Uddevalla plant, but it failed after resistance from
the national unions. The metalworkers' union in particular questioned whether
assembly work at Uddevalla was really going to be interspersed with white-
collar work to such a degree that it required a one-category employee with a
single-status agreement.
The dilemma for the blue-collar and white-collar unions involved is that the
jobs of their members are now becoming more and more integrated due to the
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unions understand the possible productivity gains and prospects for work de-
velopment. At ABB Service work organization has been totally changed by the
"T 50" project, which aims at cutting all lead times in half and doubling the
speed of product throughput. Semiautonomous work groups were set up which
were initially composed of all categories of workers, from operators organized
by the metalworkers' union to professional engineers organized by the Union
of Graduate Engineers. A condition for this form of organization to function,
however, is that different categories of workers are eventually merged in one
category (called "coworkers") with individually determined salaries. The ABB
agreement gives the local parties at each ABB Service workplace the freedom
to negotiate their own working-time regimes. Coworkers also have extra pen-
sion benefits beyond the public pension schemes and the supplementary pen-
sion plan created by central agreement.
One of the most interesting parts of the ABB coworker agreement concerns
co-determination. As in many other cases, the local parties at ABB Service
acted as if they had a local agreement on efficiency and participation. But since
no such agreement existed, the old co-determination councils and joint project
groups had unclear legal status. Now the coworker agreement will function as
a local efficiency and participation agreement (Malm and Pihlgren 1991, 91),
giving the local parties wide co-determination options in an arrangement simi-
lar to a works council system. Local unions are to set up joint local bodies for
coworkers at each plant. These will appoint employee representatives inter-
acting with management in what will in the future will be a joint council. Vari-
ous working committees will be composed of both worker and employer repre-
sentatives. At some companies it has been proposed that nonunionized workers
should also have the right to appoint representatives to the local body for co-
workers.
1
0 This would constitute a dramatic change in Swedish industrial rela-
tions, implying a development toward works councils not only for union mem-
bers but for all employees.
The coworker agreement at ABB Service is closely watched by management
at ABB headquarters and the rest of Swedish industry. According to leading
representatives of the Swedish Engineering Employers' Association, there will
be coworker agreements everywhere by the mid-1990s. The chief executive of
ABB, Percy Barnevik, hopes to conclude coworker agreements for all parts of
ABB in Sweden, encompassing 30,000 employees, in the near future.
1
1 Co-
worker agreements are likely to weaken the bipartite system oriented toward
negotiations. The aim of the employers is to conclude coworker agreements at
the firm or plant level that supersede the industry-level agreements between
the union and the employers' association. This will make the unions' struggle
for solidaristic wage policy and work development vastly more difficult.
10. Svenska Industritjanstemannaforbundet (Union of Salaried Employees in Industry) (1992,
3).
11. Speech by Percy Barnevik at the conference A Changing Working Life arranged by the ILO
and the Swedish Work Environment Fund, October 1, 1991.212 Goran Brulin
Today, it is still the central agreement that applies if there is a conflict be-
tween local and central agreements. But as time passes and coworker
agreements become more common, the legitimacy of central agreements may
diminish. As working conditions become more firm specific and local co-
determination methods are improved, it will be harder for the central unions to
uphold a common wage earner interest. One suggestion discussed by a govern-
ment commission investigating the productivity problems in Swedish industry
was to make it legally impossible to have more than one collective agreement
for a firm or workplace.
1
2 An obvious response by the vertically divided unions
would seem to be to unify their organizations to meet this challenge locally
and nationally, not least since they themselves have so strongly criticized the
Taylorist organization of work. However, historical reasons, among other
things the close connection between the LO unions and the Social Democratic
party, as well as the LO's solidaristic and collectivistic wage policy have been
major obstacles to a restructuring of the union movement.
7.7 Concluding Remarks: Influence from the European Continent
Employers and employees agree that the old joint council system failed be-
cause of certain traits of the old Swedish model, in particular solidaristic wage
policy and structural rationalization. These were dealt with above the individ-
ual firm in central bargaining and corporatist institutions at the meso- and mac-
rolevels, stripping the councils of their mission. According to an LO represen-
tative, hardly anybody misses the joint councils and they should be viewed as
an interlude (Janerus 1989, 167). However, the weakened hegemony of solida-
ristic wage policy and the declining significance of structural rationalization
from above may create opportunities for new joint consultative and council-
like arrangements at the workplace, although these bodies will hardly ever be
mandatory.
Neither the Ministry of Labor nor the SAF nor the LO believes that Sweden's
application for membership in the European Community will change the
Swedish industrial relations system. The LO and TCO hope that the "social
dimension" of the Internal Market will be realized, although they do not be-
lieve that it will affect the Swedish labor market since the floor it will create
will in all likelihood already have been reached and exceeded in Sweden. Con-
cerning the European Company Statute, both the LO and TCO view the possi-
bility of selecting a co-determination system in line with a tradition built on
collective bargaining as a major advancement for the Scandinavian countries.
The official at the LO in charge of European Community matters argues that
works councils are alien to Sweden and does not regard the former joint coun-
cils as works councils in a strict sense since they had no legal backing. They
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should rather be seen as products and parts of the collective bargaining system
(Interview, October 21, 1991).
The SAF for its part views the "social dimension" and the various participa-
tory arrangements proposed in the European Company Statute as expressions
of German influence on the European Community that will, however, hardly
be realized. The SAF used to favor some sort of works council arrangement
when it hoped to prevent the Co-determination Act. In the early 1970s a special
department at the SAF kept an eye on the issue both domestically and interna-
tionally. Today, there is no longer interest in works councils at the SAF.
The breakdown of centralism in industrial relations and Taylorism in work
organization presents labor everywhere with both opportunities and risks. In
light of the employer offensive in Sweden to get the workforce to speak with
one voice through coworker agreements, there is reason to make comparisons
with German co-determination and to ask whether works councils may provide
a buffer for unions, making their adjustment to the new rationalization meth-
ods easier. In Thelen's words, "works councils have emerged as critical actors
as plant bargaining becomes an increasingly important locus of conflict and
compromise in West Germany's dual system" (1992a, 14). German unions to-
day aim at implementing a set of centrally defined goals through a decentral-
ized mechanism. The works council has become an important instrument in
IG Metall's strategy to appropriate the kind of ability to reorganize production
that employers want when new technology and work organization are intro-
duced. Thelen shows how German unions and employers have concluded in-
dustrial agreements that charge works councils and individual employers with
negotiating the specific extent and form of flexibility within centrally defined
parameters (1992a, 14).
Swedish unions have not yet found instruments and strategies to handle the
post-Taylorist challenge. They were, however, very successful in preventing
representation outside union control. One expression of their strength was their
ability to limit the spread of quality circles. In the early 1980s Swedish em-
ployers, especially in large firms, tried to introduce quality circles and related
methods to improve productivity, creating union fears that they were trying to
build up a new participatory infrastructure beyond union influence. In the sec-
ond half of the 1980s, the quality circle movement receded, not least as a result
of union protests and resistance.
Nevertheless, the change in management strategy demands more from
unions than just rejection. Decentralization must be handled in a new way if
unions are to provide their members with real influence on work reorganiza-
tion, beyond minor information and consultation procedures and independent
of the goodwill of the employer. A dual system may be able to facilitate a
response to such a daunting challenge. If Swedish unions cannot find ways of
influencing the new management strategy at the plant level, they will lose
much of their credibility. Time-honored antipathy to council-like arrangements214 Goran Brulin
at the workplace must be superseded by a new vision of a co-determination
and participation structure in harmony with modern work organization and
rationalization methods.
According to a radical interpretation, the Co-determination Act, in combina-
tion with the other labor laws and the wage earner funds, represents a challenge
to the capitalist organization of work, and in this compares favorably with the
German works councils (Hyman 1989, 213). Swedish institutions are claimed
to enable unions to develop an autonomous position in the capitalist system
and in relation to the individual employer. The problem, however, is that proce-
dures oriented toward negotiation and based on bipartitism are weakened when
employers make radical experiments with work organization that question the
legitimacy of unions. Negotiation procedures are not suited to the smooth han-
dling of production questions, and it is hard to mobilize interest among union
members in negotiating on such matters.
Swedish unions may lose control of the rapid reorganization of the labor
process, and also of wage setting, as employers make work reorganization an
integral part of a decentralized wage formation model. Today it may be asked
whether Swedish unions would not stand stronger if they had a more formal-
ized co-determination system at the workplace, one less dependent on negotia-
tions. A quasi-constitutional system or an extended version of the old joint
councils may conceivably suit the present situation better. As long as Swedish
unions are not capable of restructuring their own organizations, workers need
more formal backing from central unions, or legal backing from the state, to
unify their voices at the workplace and to ensure that participation does not
become completely employer-controlled as, for example, in Japan.
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